We propose an axiomatic approach which economically underpins the representation of dynamic inter-temporal decisions in terms of a stochastic utility function, sensitive to the information available to the decision maker. Our construction is iterative and based on time dependent preference connections, whose characterization is inspired by the original intuition given by Debreu's State Dependent Utilities (1960).
Introduction
The criterium which leads the decisions of every agent, intervenes in many aspects of real life, determining the economical, political and financial dynamics. In a paper published in 1738 (see [1] ), Bernoulli already realized that any decision is heavily linked to the "particular circumstances of the person making the estimate", which could vary significantly depending on the observed evolution of information. For example a fund manager may start behaving in a risk seeking manner under the stress provoked by a plunge of the financial markets, which is causing severe losses. For this reason the psychological analysis and the mathematical axiomatization of the agents' behavior has gained a lot of interest, leading to a flourish stream of research literature (see [13] and the exhaustive list of references therein), with a big emphasis to the dynamics of decision making (e.g. [5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 18, 20, 21, 23] ).
In this paper we aim at characterizing a family of inter-temporal preference relations in terms of a Stochastic Dynamic Utility (SDU) and a Subjective Probability. The Stochastic Dynamic Utility fluctuates randomly depending on the moments in time when the Decision Maker observes information such as market behavior, news, catastrophic shocks or any other macro/micro factor which leads to a reconsideration of personal beliefs. The main novelty with respect to the related literature about the dynamic theory of choices, consists in providing an inter-connection between random payoffs which are defined on different instants in time, incorporating and exploiting the available information. Since different random payoffs are defined on different instants in time, the notion of preference relation 1 we are going to introduce will satisfy non-standard axioms and will take the name of Inter-Temporal Preference (ITP).
Indeed people are highly impatient when comparing present and future outcomes and both emotion-based and cognitive-based mechanisms contribute to inter-temporal distortions. In [24] , Zauberman and Urminsky provide an overview of the psychological determinants of inter-temporal choice such as impulsivity, goal completion and reward timing, different evaluation of the future in terms of concreteness, time perception and many other features:
"In sum, these findings establish that the way people perceive future time itself is an important factor in how they form their intertemporal preferences [...] What is common across the various factors influencing intertemporal preferences is that all these mechanisms influence the relative attractiveness of achieving a present goal compared to a later more distant one. "(see [24] , p. 139)
From an economical and mathematical point of view the idea of preference relations which can depend on the future state of nature goes back to the seminal celebrated paper [3] . Debreu gave an axiomatic setup (on a finite state space) under which the preferences were represented by a so-called state dependent utility function (see Theorem 6.3,  in the Appendix for the statement and [10] for further developments). State dependent preferences are sensitive to the random outcomes that may occur in the future and therefore the agent subjective utility may be affected by different future scenarios related to the occurrence of specific events. In many areas, the restriction to a finite state space is undesirable as in the modeling of financial markets. In [22] , Wakker and Zank provided an extension of Debreu's result from finite to infinite dimension, for the special case of real-valued outcomes and monotonic preferences. The development of their extended functional, additively decomposable on infinite-dimensional spaces, leads to a numerical representation of the preferences in term of a stochastic utility function u and a probability 1 We point out that the use of the term 'preference 'is slightly improper as the ordering will not be a binary relation as it is usually intended.
P (see Theorem 6.5, Appendix). The main results in [22] (and [2] ) will indeed play a key role in the development of the results contained in the present paper.
In the financial framework the classical backward approach to utility maximization has recently been argued in a series of paper by Musiela and Zariphopoulou starting from [14] and a novel forward theory has been proposed: the utility function is stochastic, time dependent and moves forwardly. In this theory, the forward utility (which replaces the indirect utility of the classic case) is built through the underlying financial market and must satisfy some appropriate martingale conditions. Inspired by this idea, Frittelli and Maggis [9] studied the conditional (dynamic) version of the classical notion of certainty equivalent (as defined in [17] ). The preliminary object is a stochastic dynamic utility u(t, x, ω) -i.e. a stochastic field -representing the evolution of the preferences of the agent. The novelty in [9] is that the (backward) conditional certainty equivalent, represents the time-s-value of the time-t-claim X, for 0 ≤ s ≤ t < ∞, capturing in this way the inter-temporal nature of preferences. Unfortunately any axiomatization of inter-temporal preferences, which could justify the representation in terms of stochastic dynamic utilities, is still missing in the literature and this paper aims at filling this empty gap.
The key ingredients of Inter-Temporal Preferences (ITP) can be summarized by four elements: first the information at each time is described by the existence of a filtration {F t } t∈[0,+∞) , i.e. a family of sigma algebras such that F s ⊆ F t for s ≤ t. Second, as ITP compares random payoffs which live at different times, we shall need to introduce a relation s,t (resp. s,t ) for s < t being two points in time. In particular g s,t f will mean that the F t -measurable payoff f (which will be fully revealed at time t) is preferred to the F s -measurable g, conditioned to the knowledge of the information available at time s (Similar for g s,t f ). Third the preference relation s,t is not total if the full information F s is not yet disclosed. The notion of conditional preferences as introduced in [4] becomes therefore an important tool to understand the nature of ITP. Finally we will assume that the agent observes real information only through a discretisation of the time line, namely t 0 = 0 < t 1 < ... < t n < . . .. We observe that in [4] a probability on the conditional sigma algebra was assumed to exist a priori. In our approach this requirement is not necessary, but we rather derive step by step a new probability update which follows directly from the decision theory structure we are choosing.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we provide two examples to motivate our study; Section 3 is devoted to the description of the set of axioms characterizing ITP and state the main representation result. In Section 4 we prove the result in the simplest unconditioned case (for trivial initial information). The aim of Section 4 is twofold: on the one hand it will serve as initial step of the induction argument we present in Section 5 to obtain the complete proof of our main Theorem 3.7. On the other hand, it is written in a self-contained manner, so that it can be read and understood independently from the general conditional setting.
Throughout the paper we shall make use of the notations described in the following short paragraph, which we here anticipate for structural convenience.
Notations. We fix a measure space (Ω, F) where Ω is the set of all possible events and F is a sigma algebra. We shall model information over time by the existence of an arbitrary filtration {F t } t∈[0,+∞) , with F t ⊆ F for every t. For any given sigma algebra G ⊆ F we denote by L(G) the space of G-measurable functions taking values in R (usually called random variables or acts) and by L ∞ (G) its subspace collecting bounded elements.
On L(G) and L ∞ (G) we shall consider the usual pointwise order f ≤ g if and only if f (ω) ≤ g(ω) for every ω ∈ Ω and similarly f < g if and only if f (ω) < g(ω) for every ω ∈ Ω. Given two elements f, g ∈ L ∞ (G) we use the notation f ∨ g, f ∧ g to indicate respectively the minimum and the maximum between f and g. For a countable family of acts {f n } n∈N ⊆ L ∞ (G) we consider the inf n f n , sup n f n the pointwise infimum/supremum of the family and recall that if the family is uniformly bounded then inf n f n , sup n f n are elements of L ∞ (G). L ∞ (G) endowed with the sup norm · ∞ becomes a Banach lattice, where f ∞ = sup ω∈Ω |f (ω)|. By 1 A , A ∈ G we indicate the element of L ∞ (G) such that 1 A (ω) = 1 if ω ∈ A and 0 otherwise. For f ∈ L ∞ (G) and A ∈ G, f 1 A denotes the restriction of f to A; for any acts f, g and event A, f 1 A + g1 A c denotes the act that agrees with f on A and with g on A c . Constant acts are identified with their associated outcomes.
Let G 1 ⊂ G 2 be two sigma algebras. For a finite partition {A 1 , ..., A n } ⊂ G 2 of Ω and
, n j=1 g j 1 A j denotes the act assigning g j on A j , ∀j = 1, ..., n. Such an act, is called simple act conditional to G 1 and S G 1 (G 2 ) denotes the space of this kind of conditional simple acts. The standard notion of simple acts can be obtained when G 1 = {∅, Ω} and the corresponding space will be denoted by S(G 2 ).
Whenever a probability P is given (Ω, F, P) becomes a measure space and as usual we shall say that a probability P is dominated by P ( P ≪ P) if P(A) = 0 implies P(A) = 0 for A ∈ F. Similarly a probability P is equivalent to P ( P ∼ P) if P ≪ P and P ≪ P. A property holds P almost surely (P-a.s.), if the set where it fails has 0 probability.
For any given sigma algebra G ⊆ F we shall denote with L 0 (Ω, G, P) the space of equivalence classes of G measurable random variables that are P almost surely equal and by L ∞ (Ω, G, P) the subspace of (P a.s.) bounded random variables. Moreover the essential (P a.s.) supremum of an arbitrary family of random variables {X λ } λ∈Λ ⊆ L 0 (Ω, G, P) will be simply denoted by P − sup{X λ | λ ∈ Λ}, and similarly for the essential infimum (see [8] Section A.5 for reference). Finally the space of P integrable random variables will be denoted by L 1 (Ω, G, P). We use the standard notation and indicate by E P [X] the Lebesgue integral of X ∈ L 1 (Ω, G, P). Moreover if H is a sigma algebra contained in G then E P [X | H] denotes the conditional expectation of X given H and P |H the restriction of the probability P on the smaller sigma algebra H.
2 Inter-temporal preferences: motivations 2.1 A toy example: state dependent utility and the role of conditional information.
Two brothers E, Y are inheriting from their old and rich grandmother. The elder brother E is asked to choose between receiving 1 million Euros immediately (at time t = 0), or waiting two years (time t 2 ) when his grandmother will move to the rest home in Sardinia and earn her wonderful villa near the Como Lake. Alternatively E could wait until the intermediate time t 1 to make up his decision, but in any case the younger brother Y will have to accept what is left from E after his decision is taken.
The value of the villa at time 0 is equal to 1 million, but of course it makes little sense to compare the two values today since the villa will be available only at t 2 . Now assume that at time t 1 election for the new Italian Government will take place and the catastrophic event of Italy leaving the European Union (with a consequent default of its economic system) may occur. Call this event A and set F t 1 = {∅, Ω, A, A c }. Brother E knows that if A c will occurs the value of the villa will increase to 1.11 · 10 6 , but in case of default it will fall down to 2 · 10 5 . The probability of the default event A is low but not negligible, say P(A) = 0.01. Finally the probability of defaulting at time t 2 (call this event D) knowing that A c occurred is almost negligible, for instance P(D | A c ) = 10 −6 (in which case the villa would be worth again 2 · 10 5 ). In case that a default did not occur neither at time t 1 nor at time t 2 then the value of the villa at t 2 would jump up to 1.8 · 10 6 . Information at time t 2 is therefore described by F t 2 the sigma algebra generated by {A, D}.
Agent E is assumed to be risk neutral as far as Italy is not defaulting i.e. u(x) = x. In case of a default (either at time t 1 or t 2 ) his utility function would beũ(x) = 1 2 x if x ≥ 0 orũ(x) = 2x if x < 0 . The naive idea is that once the default has occurred the agent give more importance in avoiding losses, rather than gaining money. We can synthesize this reasoning by introducing the stochastic dynamic utility as follows
We make the following considerations.
• If agent E compares the choice between getting 10 6 today or the villa at time t 2 , then he is comparing the utility u 0 (10 6 ) = 10 6 with respect to the expected utility of the payoff at time t 2 given by
This Expected payoff is strictly greater than 10 6 and indeed if E neglects the intermediate time t 1 then he will choose for the villa instead of immediate money. But this impulsive strategy would not lead to an optimal solution.
• Assume now that the agent first compare 10 6 with the value of the villa at time t 1 .
Then
Expected payoff = 1.11 · 10
This means that the expected value of the villa at time t 1 is the same of the cash amount of money which means that E is indifferent between taking the decision today (t = 0) or tomorrow (t 1 ). Therefore he has better waiting until the elections take place and distinguish between even A or A c . In the former case E will choose 10 6 which is in fact better than the value of the villa. In the second case he will prefer obtaining the villa at time t 2 rather than 10 6 at time t 1 . Clearly this second strategy provides an optimal final profile, since it exploits the additional intermediate information.
Expected Utility maximization and inter-temporal decisions.
This second example is inspired to the seminal paper [5] and the flourish literature on stochastic optimal control (see [16] for a detailed exposition). Intentionally no mathematical details are provided.
Consider a stochastic control problem of the form
where the sup is to be intended as a P essential supremum, A(t, X) is the set of admissible strategies (starting at time t), u is a concave utility function and V T (t, X, α) is the F Tmeasurable final payoff of the strategy α with initial random endowment X (which is
A natural question arises: is a utility u optimizer willing to invest in a strategy α from time t to time T , provided she owns today the amount X? The answer to this question is deeply related to the intertemporal comparison between X and the final value of the strategy α given by V T (t, X, α). One rational solution could be that the agent enters the dynamic investment only if she believes to hold an optimal solution. Namely
which means that the Conditional Certainty Equivalent of V T (t, X, α) is exactly X, whenever α is optimal (similarly one may defined the relations X t,T V T (t, X, α), related to sub-optimal strategies).
In this classical example, where v represents the indirect utility, we can highlight that the preference relation t,T , is non-standard and its properties need to be introduce carefully as we shall do in an abstract fashion in Section 3.
3 An axiomatization of inter-temporal preferences.
We consider a time interval [0, +∞), together with a fixed (countable) family of updating times t 0 = 0 < t 1 < . . . < t n < . . . ,. At each t i the agent shall reconsider her preference relations depending on the observed information. In particular at time t 0 = 0 no information is available, i.e. F 0 = {∅, Ω}. Information at each time t is represented by a sigma algebra F t and since information increases in time we shall have F s ⊆ F t for every s ≤ t.
In the entire paper acts are intended as real valued random variables, matching the framework used in [9, 22] 2 .
Assumption 3.1. We shall always assume throughout the paper that the agent is endowed by some initial utility function u 0 : R → R which is strictly increasing (not necessarily concave). For simplicity we will consider the case u 0 (0) = 0. follows from the idea that u 0 is inherited from the the past preference opinion of the agent.
Moreover the shape of u 0 is effective: for instance it allows to understand if at the initial time the agent is risk averse or risk seeking and in general how she evaluates variation in 2 Indeed this choice in not 'without loss of generality'. Nevertheless as explained in the introduction this research is inspired by potential financial applications and therefore we prefer to choose a more financial friendly setup.
the amount of money she owns (quoting [1] "Thus there is no doubt that a gain of one thousand ducats is more significant to a pauper than to a rich man though both gain the same amount.").
The time t 1 represents the first instant at which the agent observes available information which will potentially influence her decision. Random payoffs (or acts) at time t 1 are described by random variables in L ∞ (F t 1 ) and the agent compares these random payoffs with initial sure positions represented by elements in R. In Section 4 we shall provide the representation of an inter-temporal preference connecting the initial time t 0 = 0 to t 1 . Indeed the new inputs will affect her attitude towards decisions, generating a new utility u 1 which will depend on the state of nature realized. Once time t 1 is reached she will start considering a new aim in the next future, say t 2 , and compare random payoffs, known at time t 1 , with those which will depend on events occurring at time t 2 . From the t 0 perspective the new inter-temporal preference 1,2 will be a conditional preference relation which incorporates the further knowledge reached at time t 1 . We shall follow the idea proposed by [4] , exploiting some of the techniques there developed. This procedure will repeat iteratively at every interval from t i to t i+1 and for this reason our main result will be proved by induction over updating times. Each updating step from t i to t i+1 will be characterized by a preference interconnection i,i+1 (or i,i+1 ) satisfying conditional transition axioms. Of course since the proof proceeds by induction we will assume that we reached the desired representation up to step t i and show the representation at the succeeding time t i+1 . This will guarantee the existence of a probability P i only on the sigma algebra F t i , which we will need to update to the larger sigma algebra F t i+1 , following the Bayesian paradigm.
For the statement of Theorem 3.7, we fix an arbitrary N and a family of inter-temporal preference relations i,i+1 for i = 0, . . . , N − 1 with the following meaning: for any g ∈ L ∞ (F t i ) and f ∈ L ∞ (F t i+1 ) we say that g i,i+1 f if the agent prefers to hold the gamble g at time t i than the gamble f at time t i+1 , knowing all the information provided at time
both g i,i+1 f and g i,i+1 f , and define the family of null events for every i = 1,
The Transition Axiom. We are now ready to introduce the first axiom characterizing the Inter Temporal Preferences. Before doing so let us stress that the non-standard structure can be here highlighted, as our preference ordering is not anymore a binary relation (as it is usually understood). For this reason we shall need a reformulation of the axioms which in the following shall be related to more classical ones.
f ∈ L ∞ (F t i+1 ) then we require for i,i+1 , i,i+1 to be
Before giving an explanation of (T.i) in its full generality, we specialize it to the unconditioned case (i = 0). there exists a unique C 0,1 (f ) ∈ R such that both
We therefore consider the following induced ordering 1 : for any f, g ∈ L ∞ (F t 1 ), f 1 g if and only if C 0,1 (f ) ≤ C 0,1 (g). Indeed 1 is reflexive and inherits completeness and transitivity from 0,1 .
We now move to the interpretation of Axiom (T.i): properties 1, 5 and 6 are deeply related and inspired to the notion of conditional preference in [4] . The first property of (T.i) points out that the updating procedure necessarily leads to preferences which are complete in a conditional sense. In particular we shall see in Lemma 5.3 (which is the counterpart of Lemma 3.2 in [4] ) that local completeness allows to compare two acts on three disjoint F t i measurable events. Consistency and stability can be understood in terms of information achieved: for example consistency states that if the agent prefer g ∈ L ∞ (F t i ) at time t i rather than f ∈ L ∞ (F t i+1 ) at time t i+1 knowing that event A ∈ F t i has occurred, than she shall prefer g for any condition B ∈ F t i , B ⊆ A.
The property 2 in (T.i) is the conditional generalization of its counterpart in (T.0). Normalization (property 3) says that F t i null events are preserved in the one step updating.
In particular the agent is indifferent between random payoffs which differ from 0 by a negligible F t i measurable set (Loosely speaking "Holding nothing is indifferent throughout time", up to null events). Non degeneracy (property 4) is the more technical one and guarantees some simplifications in our arguments, since it implies that any random payoff f at time t i+1 admits an F t i -measurable g which is more/less preferred (it is nevertheless a very weak requirement which is satisfied in all the cases of interest).
Example 3.3. In the framework of Section 2.2 we can understand better the meaning of Axiom (T.i) 1,5,6. In fact the preference relation X t,T V T (t, X, α) is defined via the inequality between F t -measurable random variables,
and inherits those properties which are characterizing the conditional expectation (namely Axiom (T.i) 1,5,6, replacing t i with t and t i+1 with T ).
The definition of Conditional Certainty Equivalent is the basis of our representation results and follows from the idea in [9] . In Section 5 we shall show by induction the existence (and uniqueness) of the Conditional Certainty Equivalent at each time step. In what follows we shall use these notations for any g ∈ L ∞ (F t i ) and
• g ∼ i,i+1 f if both g i,i+1 f and g i,i+1 f hold;
Remark 3.6. We observe that consistency jointly to stability of i,i+1 (similar for i,i+1 )
imply the following pasting properties:
• for a family {A n } n∈N ⊆ F t i of disjoint events and A = ∪ n A n we have
Axiom (T.i) is the key ingredient to obtain the updating construction we are aiming at.
In particular assume that at time t i the agent is characterized by a couple (P i , u i ) where P i is the subjective probability on measurable events F t i and u i is a state dependent utility such that u i (x, ·) is F t i -measurable. We shall prove in Proposition 5.1 that if i,i+1
f }. Moreover V i+1 represents the transition order i.e.
Integral representation of Inter Temporal Preferences. We will take into consideration the following axioms: monotonicity, the Sure Thing Principle and a technical continuity, adapted to this conditional setting, which will lead to a representation of the ITP in the desired integral form.
(ST.i) Sure-Thing Principle. Given arbitrary
We are now ready to state the main contribution of this paper: Theorem 3.7 provides the representation of ITP in terms of a unique probability P and a stochastic field u(t, x, ω), which describes the random fluctuations of preferences. These were exactly the elements exploited in [9] to determine the dynamics of the Conditional Certainty Equivalent. 
(b) u(t i , ·, ω) is strictly increasing in x and u(t i , 0, ω) = 0 3 , for all ω ∈ Ω;
Relative uniqueness: the couple (P, u) can be replaced by (P * , u * ) if and only if P is equivalent to P * on F t N and for any i = 1, . . . , N we have P(u * (t i , ·, ·) = δ i u i ) = 1, where δ i is the Radon-Nikodym derivative of P |Ft i with respect to P * |Ft i .
Since the proof of Theorem 3.7 will proceed inductively we choose to present the theory in the simpler unconditioned case 0,1 (see Section 4). The results in the next section will be therefore necessary to prove the initial step in the induction argument of Theorem 3.7.
Moreover we stress that the relative uniqueness is sharper than in representation results like those contained in [2, 22] . This follows from the fact that the u 0 is fixed a priori (together with the normalization condition u(t i , 0, ω) = 0) and plays the role of an initial (constraining) condition (see also Proposition 4.8 for further details).
Unconditioned inter-temporal preference
We consider a Decision Maker who compares an initial amount of some good, whose value is surely determined (and its benefit is immediate) with respect to a bounded random payoffs (e.g. bets, assets, future value of goods) at a fixed time t 1 represented by elements in the space L ∞ (F t 1 ). We say that the agent is initially naive, as the initial information are represented by the trivial F 0 = {∅, Ω} and therefore the space L ∞ (F 0 ) is isometric to the real line R.
Consider the transition preference 0,1 (or 0,1 ) which connects
As already observed in the case i = 0 the first Axiom (T.0) is composed only by four requirements: completeness, transitivity, normalization and non degeneracy (which is the more technical requirement, we shall use in Lemma 4.3).
Remark 4.1. From Notation 3.5 we can easily deduce the meaning of the notations a ∼ 0,1
We also recall that the set of null events induced by 0,1 is given by We now show that under (T.0) the CCE exists and is unique. Notice that this notion of certainty equivalent matches the dynamic generalization introduced by [9] . The CCE will also provide a natural representation of the inter-temporal preference 0,1 (see the following Proposition 4.5).
Consider the maps
We note that in the definition of V ± 1 (f ), u 0 needs not to be fixed. Indeed if we consider the total ordering on L ∞ (F t 1 ) induced by the functionals V 
Proof. Existence and uniqueness follow from the previous Lemma 4.3 and Assumption
Notice that
a 0,1 f (resp. a 0,1 f ) obviously implies u 0 (a) ≤ V 1 (f ) (resp. u 0 (a) ≥ V 1 (f
)). For the reverse implication we can observe that
We will take into consideration the following axioms: monotonicity, the Sure Thing
Principle and a technical continuity, which we recall here to clarify their meaning in this simplified unconditioned case.
(ST.0) Sure-Thing Principle: consider arbitrary f, g, h ∈ S(F t 1 ), A ∈ F t 1 \ N (F t 1 ) and a ∈ R such that a 0,1 f 1 A + h1 A c and a 0,1 g1 A + h1 A c then for any k ∈ S(F t 1 )
there exists b ∈ R such that b 0,1 f 1 A + k1 A c and b 0,1 g1 A + k1 A c .
(C.0) Pointwise continuity: consider any uniformly bounded sequence {f n } ⊆ L ∞ (F t 1 ), such that f n (ω) → f (ω) for any ω ∈ Ω, then for all a ≺ 0,1 f (resp. a ≻ 0,1 f ) there exists N such that a 0,1 f n (resp. a 0,1 f n ) for n > N .
Remark 4.6. In the classical Decision Theory (see [15] ) the Sure-Thing Principle is a sort of independence principle: it says that the preference between two acts, f and g, should only depend on the values of f and g when they differ. If f and g differ only on an event A, if A does not occur f and g result in the same outcome exactly. In our inter-temporal framework the interpretation is exactly the same, even though we need to deal with the comparison at time 0.
Remark 4.7. Under Axiom (T.0) the Sure-Thing Principle (ST.0) easily implies for arbitrary f, g ∈ L ∞ (F t 1 ) and A ∈ F t 1 :
In the remaining of this section we shall prove the following and a function u 1 (·, ω) : R → R strictly increasing ∀ω ∈ Ω, such that
The following uniqueness holds for (4.5) : (P 1 , u 1 ) can be replaced by (P * , u * ) if and only if P 1 is equivalent to P * and P 1 (u * = δu 1 + τ ) = 1, where δ is the Radon-Nikodym derivative of P 1 with respect to P * and τ ∈ L(F t 1 ) with E P * [τ ] = 0. show that the coefficient σ > 0 appearing in Theorem 6.5 is necessarily equal to 1.
Remark 4.10. We observe that even if not mentioned explicitly, necessarily the random variable u 1 (x, ·) is integrable with respect to P 1 for any x ∈ R.
Moreover if we impose the normalization requirement u 1 (0, ω) = 0 for every ω ∈ Ω then τ is equal to 0 P-a.s..
Proof of Proposition 4.8.
We define a weak order on L ∞ (F t 1 ) as f g if and only if
g). (T.0) implies is complete, reflexive and transitive (i.e. satisfies (A1) in the Appendix).
Let f ∈ L ∞ (F t 1 ) and outcomes x > y: indeed (M.0) implies
, for all nonnull events A ∈ F t 1 and hence is strictly monotone in the sense of (A2). Similarly (ST.0) implies (A3).
Let now {f n } ⊆ L ∞ (F t 1 ), such that f n (ω) → f (ω) for any ω ∈ Ω and f n ∞ < k for all
Moreover both u n (ω) → f (ω) and l n (ω) → f (ω) for every ω ∈ Ω. From (M.0)
so that b ≻ 0,1 f . From (C.0) we find N such that b 0,1 u n for all n > N , which is in fact a contradiction since it would imply
. This also implies that satisfies (A4).
We can therefore apply Theorem 6.5 and find the desired representation (4.5) namely
and its uniqueness. Let therefore P * and u * (·, ·) = τ + σδu 1 (·, ·) obtained by Theorem 6.5. Observe that
, we have necessarily σ = 1.
Inductive proof of Theorem 3.7
This section is entirely devoted to the proof of the main Theorem of this paper.
On the direct implication (⇒). We shall proceed by induction.
In fact if N = 1 Theorem 3.7 reduces to Proposition 4.8, which is proved in the previous Section 4.
Assumption 5.1.
[Induction] We assume that the statement is true up to i: in particular it means that we can guarantee the existence of a probability P i on F t i and stochastic utility
for any k = 1, . . . , i.
Under this assumption we shall now prove that the representation can be forwardly updated to time t i+1 .
Remark 5.2. We point out that N (F t i ) = {A | ∃B ∈ F t i , P i (B) = 0 and A ⊆ B}, where N (F t i ) are the null sets induced by the relations i−1,i , i−1,i as in (3.1).
Although a conditional preference is not total, the following lemma, which is inspired by Lemma 3.2 in [4] , shows that local completeness allows to derive for every two acts an F t i -measurable partition on which a comparison can be achieved. 
There exists a pairwise disjoint family of events A, B, C ∈ F t i such that P i (A ∪ B ∪ C) = 1 and
for every n which implies P i (∪ n A n ) = S (from (T.i) and Remark 3.6 we have ∪ n A n ∈ E).
We finally show that up to null events ∪ n A n represents the largest event on which g is conditionally equivalent to f : letÃ ∈ E and B =Ã \ (∪ n A n ). Then B ∪ (∪ n A n ) ∈ E and
We therefore set A := ∪ n A n and consider U := {B ∈ F t i ,B ⊆ A c : g1B i,i+1 f 1B}.
Notice that from the construction of A if we findB ∈ U such that g1B ∼ i,i+1 f 1B then P i (B) = 0. Following the same argument as in the previous step we construct a maximal B ∈ U such that P i (B) ≥ P i (B) for allB ∈ U : indeed it is not possible the finding of B ′ ⊂ B such that g1 B ′ i,i+1 f 1 B ′ and therefore g ≻ B i,i+1 f . Finally we can consider D := {C ∈ F t i ,C ⊆ (A ∪ B) c : g1C i,i+1 f 1C} and following the same reasoning we can find C ∈ D such that P i (C) ≥ P i (C) for allC ∈ D and g ≺ C i,i+1 f . By construction P i (A ∪ B ∪ C) = 1 and the probability of the intersections is always 0.
Consider for any g ∈ L ∞ (F t i ) the upper and lower level sets
f } and the maps 
Notation 5.5. We shall often use the notation u
We have from Remark 3.6 that (F t i ) . From the monotonicity of u i we have
Observe that if P i (Ā) = 0 we have the thesis. Otherwise we claim that for any B ⊆Ā,
To show the claim we consider first the case g λ 1 B i,i+1 f 1 B for some B ⊆Ā, B ∈ F t i and P i (B) > 0, since the other follows in a similar way. As a consequence of Remark 3.6 we have
Therefore g λ 1 B i,i+1 f 1 B cannot occur for any for B ⊆Ā, B ∈ F t i and P i (B) > 0.
Similarly we can obtain that g λ 1 B i,i+1 f 1 B cannot occur for any for B ⊆Ā, B ∈ F t i and P i (B) > 0, concluding the proof of the claim. 
and necessarily
Proof. In this proof we denote (with a slight abuse of notation) by V i+1 (f ) any of its F t i -measurable version. Existence and uniqueness follow from the previous Lemma 5. 4 .
We only need to show that
(we are assuming u i (·, x) is integrable for any x). At the same time from u i strictly increasing in x we can deduce g 1 ≤ C i,i+1 (f ) ≤ g 2 , P i almost surely.
To show the representation property (5.6) and (5.7), we consider the case g i,i+1 f as
For the reverse implication notice that on the set A = {u i (g) = V i+1 (f )} we necessarily
f } (This can be easily verified applying (T.i)).
Corollary 5.8. Let Assumption 5.1 holds and i,i+1 satisfies (T.i). For any f ∈ L ∞ (F t i+1 ) and A ∈ F t i we have
Proof. From the previous construction we have u
, P i almost surely and hence the thesis. 
Last step of the proof for (⇒): Let Assumption 5.1 holds and i,i+1 satisfies all the Axioms (T.i), (M.i), (ST.i) and (C.i). In order to conclude the proof we show that there exist a probability P i+1 on (Ω, F t i+1 ) which agrees with P i on F t i and a stochastic utility u i+1 (ω, ·) : R → R strictly increasing ∀ω ∈ Ω, such that
We define an inter-temporal preference relation between time 0 and t i+1 as a 0,i+1 f (resp. a 0,i+1 f ) if and only if u 0 (a)
Simple inspections show that 0,i+1 satisfies (T.0), (M.0) and (ST.0).
We now prove the continuity (C.0): consider any uniformly bounded sequence {f n } ⊆
f follows in a similar way) so that we necessarily have u 0 (a)
Since g ≺ i,i+1 f we apply (C.i) and find a sequence of indexes {n k } ∞ k=1 and a partition {A k } ∞ k=1 ⊂ F t i such that for any k we have g1
To show the existence of such g we need to consider for any ε > 0, Ci,i+1(f ) − ε so that ui(Ci,i+1(f ) − ε) < ui(Ci,i+1(f )) = Vi+1(f ); observing that ui(Ci,i+1(f )−ε) increases monotonically to ui(Ci,i+1(f )) (for any ω ∈ Ω) we can find anε such that u0(a)
|u i (C i,i+1 (−d))| and pointwise converges to u i (g). From Dominated Convergence Theorem we can findN such that
which shows (C.0) of 0,i+1 .
Given this premise we can apply Proposition 6.5 and find a probability P on F t i+1 and a stochastic utility u such that
Notice from (T.i) point 3 that P is equivalent to P i on F t i . For P |Ft i being the restriction of
, which is an F t i -measurable random variable. For any A ∈ F t i+1
u(ω, x) and notice that P i+1 (A) = P i (A) for any A ∈ F t i . We have
so that we can obtain for every A ∈ F t i that
which implies the representation (5.8).
On the reverse implication (⇐). We now assume that there exist a probability P on The only critical point is showing property (C.i). To this aim let {f n } ⊆ L ∞ (F t i+1 ) be a uniformly bounded sequence, such that f n (ω) → f (ω) for any ω ∈ Ω. Choose any
As f n ∞ < d for all n ∈ N we build the increasing sequence l n :
and notice l n ≤ f n and l n (ω) → f (ω) for any ω ∈ Ω. Moreover l n ∞ < d for all n ∈ N and consequently |u(t i+1 , l n )| ≤ |u(t i+1 , d)| which is integrable. We can apply the Dominated Convergence Theorem for conditional expectation and obtain
for any ω ∈ Ω (by choosing an opportune version of the conditional expectation). Consider the sequence of sets {B n } n∈N ⊂ F t i defined by
Indeed ∪ k B k = Ω from the pointwise convergence and we deduce that the pairwise disjoint
A i ) satisfies again ∪ k A k = Ω and forms therefore a partition of Ω. We conclude by observing that for any n ≥ k we have f n ≥ l k and therefore
The argument repeats in the same way when g ≻ i,i+1 f .
On the uniqueness. To conclude the proof we need to show the relative uniqueness.
Consider the new couple (P * , u * ) such that P is equivalent to P * on F t N and for any i = 1, . . . , N we have P(u * (t i , ·, ·) = δ i u i ) = 1, where δ i is the Radon-Nikodym derivative of P |Ft i with respect to P * |Ft i
. We show for any arbitrary i = 1, . .
as the second one is similar. To this aim we recall the martingality property
and the conditional change of measure
Moreover the equivalence between P and P * allows to write the following inequalities indifferently in the P/P * almost sure sense so that we obtain
On the contrary suppose that (P * , u * ) are given in a way such that for i = 1, . . . , N :
for all ω ∈ Ω and
) ≤ E P * [u * (t i , f )|F t i−1 ] P * -a.s. ⇐⇒ u(t i−1 , g) ≤ E P [u(t i , f )|F t i−1 ] P-a.s., for any arbitrary, g ∈ L ∞ (F t i ), f ∈ L ∞ (F t i+1 ). The equivalence of P and P * follows immediately. Moreover for any ω ∈ Ω we imposed u(t i , 0, ω) = u * (t i , 0, ω) = 0. For i = 1
we already know P(u * (t 1 , ·, ·) = δ 1 u 1 ) = 1 from Proposition 4.8. Let δ i = E P * dP dP * | F t i as before and consider the first i = 2, . . . , N such that either the set A = {ω ∈ Ω | u * (t i , ·, ω) > δ i u i (·, ω)} or A = {ω ∈ Ω | u * (t i , ·, ω) < δ i u i (·, ω)} have positive probability.
Let C i−1,i (1 A ) be the CCE of 1 A so that u * (t i−1 , C i−1,i (1 A )) = E P * [u * (t i , 1 A )|F t i−1 ] P * -a.s. and u(t i−1 , C i−1,i (1 A )) = E P [u(t i , 1 A )|F t i−1 ] P-a.s.
Subtracting the two equations would lead to a contradiction since the left hand side is always equal to 0 (P-a.s.) whereas the right hand side is not.
Appendix
As in the rest of the paper (Ω, F) denotes a measurable space and L ∞ (F) is the space of all acts, represented by real valued F-measurable and bounded random variables.
In this appendix the preference relation is a binary relation on L ∞ (F) : for f , g ∈ L ∞ (F), if f is preferred to g, write f g. The preference relation satisfies the following axioms:
(A1) Preference order: if it is reflexive (∀f ∈ L ∞ (F), f ∼ f ), complete (∀f, g ∈ L ∞ (F), f g or f g) and transitive (∀f, g, h ∈ L ∞ (F) such that f g and g h then f h) Definition 6.1. A representing function of the preference relation is a function V :
L ∞ (F) → R which is order-preserving, i.e.,
We use the standard conventions: f g if g f ; f ∼ f if both g f and f g; g ≁ f if either g f or f g; g ≻ f if g f but f g. Definition 6.2. An event A ∈ F is null if f 1 A + g1 A c ∼ g ∀f, g ∈ L ∞ (F).We shall denote by N (F) be the set of null events.
As a consequence a -atom is an element A ∈ F such that for every B ∈ F with ∅ = B ⊂ A either B or A \ B is null.
An event is essential if it belongs to F \ N (F).
We can consider the following additional Axioms:
(A2) Strictly monotone if x1 A + f 1 A c ≻ y1 A + f 1 A c , for all nonnull events A ∈ F, for all f ∈ L ∞ (F) and outcomes x > y.
(A3) Sure-thing principle: consider arbitrary f, g, h ∈ L ∞ (F) and A ∈ F such that f 1 A +h1 A c g1 A +h1 A c then for every c ∈ L ∞ (F) we have f 1 A +c1 A c g1 A +c1 A c .
(A3) holds on S(F) if we substitute in the previous statement L ∞ (F) with S(F) (as defined in the paragraph Notations).
(A4') Norm continuity if ∀f ∈ L ∞ (F) the sets {g ∈ L ∞ (F) : g f } and {g ∈ L ∞ (F) :
f g} are · ∞ -closed. (ii) is a norm continuous, strictly monotonic preference order that satisfies the sure thing principle.
The following uniqueness holds for (1) : W (f ) = n j=1 W j (f (ω j )) represent if and only if there exist τ 1 , ..., τ n ∈ R and σ > 0 such that W j = τ j + σV j ∀j, implying that W = τ + σV for τ = τ 1 + ... + τ n .
In [22] the previous Theorem is generalized to an infinite state spaces Ω when Ω contains no atoms. We here recall the integral reformulation of the Debreu representation given in [2] under pointwise continuity.
Definition 6.4. A preference order is
(A4) Pointwise continuous if for any uniformly bounded sequence {f n } ⊆ L ∞ (F), such that f n (ω) → f (ω) for any ω ∈ Ω then ∀g ∈ L ∞ (F) such that g ≻ f (resp. g ≺ f )
∃J ∈ N such that g ≻ f j (resp. g ≺ f j ) ∀j > J. (ii) satisfies: (A1), (A2), (A3) on S(F), (A4).
The following uniqueness holds: the couple (P, u) can be replaced by (P * , u * ) if and only if P and P * are equivalent and P(u * = τ + σδu) = 1, where τ : Ω → R is F-measurable, σ > 0 and δ is the Radon-Nikodym density function of P with respect to P * .
